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This article explores possible signs on learning in organizations following two major rail-
way accidents in Norway, the Tretten accident in 1975 and the Åsta accident in 2000. These
are the most serious railway accidents to have occurred in the past decades and both
involved collisions on a single track system. The two events have been analyzed and com-
pared in order to investigate possible learning effects and possible differences in learning
given the 25-year span between them. The study is based on the analysis of selected doc-
uments related to the accidents in general and the narrative components in the documen-
tation related to learning in particular.
Our ﬁndings indicate that learning from these events was not expressed as an explicit
goal in the aftermath. Learning in these cases seems to be linked for a large part to a change
in measures, technical, operational and organizational, but we have not observed any man-
aged conﬁrmation or comprehension processes. The Tretten accident report suggests that
the possibility of human error should be mitigated through the implementation of techno-
logical barriers, while it omits all other elaborations and risk reducing measures. The Åsta
accident report recommended that the work to introduce modern safety management
principles that had already been initiated before the accident should be continued. Neither
of the accidents yielded any new insights and the knowledge brought forward was merely
perceived as conﬁrmation of already-agreed changes.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Railway safety in Europe has signiﬁcantly improved over the last 30 years, with a general reduction in the total amount of
fatalities (Evans, 2011; Silla and Kallberg, 2012). However, the tendency is not so clear for major accidents, with ﬁve fatalities
or more. During the 1990-ies many developed countries privatized their railway systems, which many considered a threat to
safety. Andrew Evans (2007, 2010, 2013) has explored the safety effects from privatization in several countries. He found no
support for increasing accident rates, measured in fatal accident rate normalized on train work (km). On the contrary Jupe
and Crompton (2006) claim that the quality of the railway services deteriorated the ﬁrst ten years after the privatization,
thus, changes to the systems’ functioning were experienced. Assessing the rail safety management principles and perfor-
mances from coarse accident statistics is not possible. The major issue of comprehensive accident investigations is how risk
management of major rail accidents has been conducted, which was the motivation for this study.
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In recent history Norway has faced major train accidents almost every 10 years. In 1975 a major accident occurred near
Tretten station in the eastern part of Norway, killing 27 persons. The head-on collision in 2000 at Åsta, between Rudstad and
Rena stations (also in the eastern part of Norway), killed 19 persons. These accidents are suitable for comparison as they both
concerned two trains head-on at the same single track.
Many researchers, for example Hopkins (2008), Kletz (2009) and Leveson (2004), claim that re-occurrences of accidents
are evidence that people and organizations fail to learn. Can we say that such statements are correct? The aim of this article
is to analyze the reception history of the narratives from the accidents as they appear in written material in and from the
concerned organizations with special focus on the learning effects from these two major accidents on the Norwegian rail
transport system.
According to Marcuse, ‘‘reception history’’ is the history of the meanings imputed to historical events (Marcuse, 2009).
This approach traces the different ways in which participants and observers, historians and other retrospective interpreters
have attempted to make sense of events, both as they unfolded, and subsequently over time, to make them meaningful for
the time in which they lived and live. Furthermore, Marcuse claims that there are two aspects of reception: the way an event
was portrayed (by the multipliers and makers of public opinion), and the ways in which those portrayals were perceived by
individuals (and by the population at large). The reception history approach stems from humanistic and theological sciences,
especially those based on a study of textual material.
It is often claimed that formalized accident investigations, especially when performed by independent groups or boards,
are important in enabling us to derive beneﬁt from the accident experience (Stoop and Roed-Larsen, 2009). The Tretten and
Åsta accidents were both investigated and attracted major public attention for weeks and months. There is no doubt that
processes were initiated to deal with the accident, but could we then say these processes were set up for anyone to learn
from?
In our study we were interested in two main questions:
1. What experience gained through the accidents survived in the organizations and inﬂuenced future safety efforts?
2. What was the impact of the formalized investigation processes?
The main issue of this comparative case study (Andersen, 1997) has been to track the reception history of texts that are
relevant for our understanding of the accidents and their subsequent effects – effects that we can relate in some way to
learning. This is what we mean by the concept ‘‘experiences that survive in the organization’’. It relates to the long term
effects, from which we can draw the reception history embedded in the railway sector as such. We claim that this is also
relevant for our purpose, as we concentrate on texts as carriers of evidence and experience related to the incidents.
Even though large time span between the accidents we claim that the reception histories address how accident were
explored for learning, based on rich context-dependent knowledge which could be generalized (Flyvbjerg, 2004). We decided
to restrict our data collection to written material as both accidents occurred over 10 years back in time. We therefore pre-
sumed that data collection through interviews could present information bias by the continuing storytelling inside the orga-
nizations following such major incidents. Our method is close reading, searching for textual traits of learning from the
experience gained through the accidents. This study was part of a research project that included several approaches to reveal
learning effects from accident investigations in Scandinavia (Njå et al., 2010).
2. The theoretical presumptions
Our starting point is that experience from accidents is important for improving the safety performance of railway orga-
nizations. This has been claimed by several researchers and practitioners (Johnson, 2000; Maurino et al., 1995; Moshansky,
1992; Stoop, 2002). However, Johnson (2001) claims that this potential is not fully explored because accident investigations
are so comprehensive that it is impossible for practitioners to interpret the connections between change recommendations
(conclusions) and the accident evidence. Kletz agrees with this scepticism, but he attributes negligence as a greater cause of
why learning does not occur (Kletz, 2002). Jakobsson (2010) did a historical analysis of the Swedish and Norwegian accident
investigation boards and found that they both speciﬁed learning as the major goal and outcome of accident investigation, but
neither of them explained how learning should be understood nor achieved. Halvorsrud (2002) emphasizes that for her
employer, the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate, the Åsta accident investigation enhanced the Inspectorate’s position in rela-
tion to the other actors in the sector. Rosness further claims that a prerequisite for learning from accident investigations is
that the ﬁndings must be framed in a way that enables us to ‘‘see how normal organizational processes can contribute to a
disaster’’ (Rosness, 2009).
In order to scrutinize how learning, in its positive connotation, has been affected by the reception histories from the two
accidents, we need to clarify what we understand by learning. Learning in organizations relates to the organization’s new
abilities to prevent similar events from happening. In this respect ‘‘organizational learning’’ researchers have focused on
the capability of an organization’s newly-established knowledge to impose changes in structures, processes or results in
the relevant settings. It is not only the hardware that has been changed but also the members of the organization. In this
respect we acknowledge that learning may be observed as changes. Hence, all kinds of changes might be related to learning
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must include performance assessment of the changes.
However, an individual’s learning process is not restricted to observable changes (Sommer et al., 2013). Cognitive pro-
cesses in the individual as well in the sociocultural working environment, both within and across organizational borders
are important. Such learning processes yield both conﬁrmation of existing knowledge and deeper comprehension of existing
practices, equipment and tools as legitimate goals for learning (Fuglseth and Grønhaug, 2006). In our study we understand
renewed knowledge as theoretical (factual) knowledge as well as practical skills and the attitudes needed for integration of
the knowledge and skills in individual or collective behavior, within restructured contexts and working conditions. Revealing
aspects of conﬁrmation and comprehension is difﬁcult because those concepts are individually obtained and difﬁcult to com-
municate through formal documents retrieved decades after being issued. Here we employ close reading, which ‘‘is the kind
of reading in which the reader, as a matter of habit, pays attention not only to the words and the plot but to all aspects of the
literary apparatus of a text’’. Close reading may also ‘‘frame the texts historically, politically, semiotically, economically, in
terms of individual and organizational responses to threats, public assessments, opportunities etc, and yet subsequent critics
cannot but ground their critique in their own close readings of texts’’ (Charon, 2006, p. 113).
As both apprehensions and practices in organizations or other social structures are based on individuals, we believe that
the least unit applicable in studying learning must be the single individual. When studying larger units such as groups, orga-
nizations and societies we also think that the study of learning on individual level is of crucial interest, as not only cognitive
processes but also behavior and changes in social systems rely upon the participation from individuals. Well-designed and
elaborated texts, such as accident investigation reports, should in our view explain what must be learned from an accident.
In sorting these learning elements into basic prerequisites, we have employed Schön’s (1991) ideas on information, context
and reﬂection. This has resulted in three groups (Braut and Njå, 2010):
1. Elements related to content, information, message, epistemological basis, and desired cognitive structures.
2. Elements related to relevant context and involved communities.
3. Elements related to commitment, objectives and measures for learning, rewarding, motivation and evaluation.
We therefore claim that we are able to reveal possible learning effects through textual analysis by close reading of
reception histories after major accidents, based on assessment of changes, comprehension and conﬁrmation of the rail-
way sector’s practices. Content, context and commitment are concepts included in how the reception history has been
framed.
3. Material
In order to describe what impact experiences from these accidents have had on organizations, procedures and technolog-
ical design, relevant written material from the period immediately before, and several years after, each accident has been
examined. We have explored how these experiences were adapted for learning among employees and managers in the
affected organizations.
The study is based on analyzes of documents, obtained partly from open access sources (libraries, public archives, mass
media) and partly made available by the railway organizations upon request by the researchers. With respect to the Tretten
accident we have reviewed documents covered by legal requirements concerning conﬁdentiality about personal matters,
with the major aim of retrieving contextual details of how individuals responded and how reactions were obtained from
the information coverage of the event itself. Access to this material has been given in compliance with legal requirements
laid down in the Norwegian Administrative Act. The Internet has been of limited value as one of the accidents occurred well
before the advent of the world wide web.
As we chose only to study written materials, we tried to get access to a multitude of sources that could give us the oppor-
tunity to study facts, interpretations and decisions based upon experiences from the accidents as they were perceived at the
time of writing. In this way we sought to get an understanding of the reception history of the knowledge produced through
the accidents at certain points of time.
The documents have been accessed from these sources:
 Norwegian State Railways, NSB (e.g. accident investigations, internal documents containing minutes of meetings from the
board in the period 1998–2002).
 Norwegian National Rail Administration, JBV, including the Norwegian Railway Museum (e.g. accident investigation,
internal documents on processes related to safety issues on the infrastructure before and after 2000, including correspon-
dence with the Ministry of Transport and Communications, accident statistics for the period 1973–2001).
 The National Archives (e.g. material on the Tretten accident consisting of the investigation report and related technical
material, i.e. material meeting the archival criteria from 1970 to 1982).
 Open sources, such as professional magazines (e.g. Vårt Yrke, Jernbanemanden, Vingehjulet and Kjøreveien for the periods
around the studied accidents) and documents presented from the government to the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget)
on budget and planning issues related to the railway sector.
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30).
 Media articles and broadcasting reports (e.g. television news reports from the Tretten accident).
We have also compared our ﬁndings to previous research on these accidents.4. Method
The written documents from different organizations and different organizational levels have been approached by close
reading (Charon, 2006; Kain, 1998; Wolfreys, 2000) where we have tried to follow elements related to accident causes
and effects along a time line. In our reading we have not employed any particular cause-effect-model for understanding
the incidents, other than we have presumed that incidents are preceded by a multitude of possible factors at different point
of time and at different organizational level. Our aim has been to follow core issues related to organization, technology and
prevailing opinions on safety from before the accident and into the aftermath. We have also tried to ﬁnd out how textual
material related to the accidents was received in the period following the accidents.
The core elements in the method are detailed reading of the text to identify meaning units and interrogating the text by
asking questions such as: Where does the text come from? How did it appear? What does it answer? How was it answered?
How does it change the meaning of other texts?
It is necessary to see the world from the vantage point of the narrator and to experience, vicariously, events from that
stance. We apply Charon’s ideas in our close reading of the texts (Charon, 2006). This tool builds on the ﬁve concepts frame,
form, time, plot and desire, which Charon combines with narrative features of medicine, namely temporality, singularity cau-
sality/contingency, intersubjectivity and ethicality. For our purposes we read the text with the mindset of change, compre-
hension and conﬁrmation, based on the contents and the context of the stories and the presumed commitments presented.
Frame contains speciﬁc assumptions about the goals and issues of the texts and if a text focuses on particular conse-
quences to be brought about from its reading. An accident investigation report sometimes places responsibility, which could
be seen as part of the framing. Framing the text always reveals something about what forces bring this particular writer and
reader together, and in what way this was achieved. What, in effect, is left in and what is left out of this text? How did the
author draw borders around events, people, time periods, or emotions in determining the purview of the work? Minutes of
meetings from boardrooms involved in an accident could be seen as preparations for the future defense.
Form consists of genre, visible structure, narrator, metaphor, allusion and diction. The literary text (genre) has its own
rules and conventions, requiring particular skills from the writer and calling forth particular forms of attention from the
reader, for example requiring effort from the reader. The reader should scrutinize the visible structure of the text that allows
the reader to query the meaning of the breaks, the impact of the tempo, and the message of the rhythm of the work. Charon
further emphasizes under form that (p. 117–119): ‘‘Besides making overarching distinctions regarding the narrator’s reliabil-
ity and his or her positioning vis-à-vis the plane of the story and the action of the plot, it is important to examine experiential
aspects of the story’s teller. A narrator can be intimate, or can be experienced as remote, skeptical, unforgiving or judging. All
thinking, scientiﬁc and mathematical as well as poetic, is metaphorical, because metaphor is how the human brain travels.
All texts speak to other texts – they cannot help it – and the close reader is alert to the echoes of these intertextual conver-
sations. Diction is the linguistic register in which a work is written. By characterizing the manner of language as casual or
formal, breezy or bureaucratic, contemporary or timeless, the reader can identify the mood, level of gravity, kind of authority
being sought, and kind of intimacy with the reader being desired by the work’’.
Time is about identifying the text’s temporal structure. Readers who approach the written material in a structured way,
paying attention to order, duration, story-time, discourse-time, and velocity can enter the narrative world with new ease.
The story-time is a lived experience for the reader, conferring acuteness or chronicity on the reading act itself.
Plot concerns getting to know and living with a story’s characters, entering imaginatively into its setting, and undergoing
its events seem to many to be the fundamental things one does with a story. The plot of an accident begins as a string of
chronologically related events, but then takes various directions dependent on the assumptions made. One cannot separate
the plot from the form in which it is given. Charon (2006, p. 124) states that, the plot is revealed from the texts, by the ‘‘com-
bination of cognitive, affective, imaginative and characterological abilities that are called into play’’.
Desire is about the ultimate goal for the teller. Charon (2006, p. 125) claims that desire includes what hunger seems to
have been fulﬁlled in the teller by virtue of his or her writing act. Desire powers the production and the consumption of
a text, and recognizing the satisfactions of reading (pleasures of the text) enhances not only the reward but also the accuracy
of our appreciation of the text. The reader experiencing his or her desires in response to a text is living the penetration and
transformation that takes place when incorporating a story into self. We nourish ourselves with the stories we hear and read;
we metabolize them and incorporate them into our tissues, derive energy from them, become more of who we are by virtue
of their fuel.
Using this approach we try to trace through the written material how experiences from the accidents alone or combined
with existing knowledge at any time have been used for learning purposes. Drawing on the multitude of education theories
we used a list of possible learning effects emerging from the reception histories (Braut and Njå, 2010). We assume that learn-
ing, even in organizations, is oriented towards individuals. Learning is certainly based upon the willingness and ability to
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reception history and thus the learning from the single events. We therefore scrutinize both the texts from investigation
reports for their accommodated learning and also the aftermath responses and descriptions of the events through relevant
documents issued in the years after the accidents. The analysis is somewhat complex as we have studied documents written
for and about society at large, as well as documents presenting individual perspectives.
After the textual analyzes were conducted and results documented in a preparatory manuscript, we sent this document
for review by two employees from the NSB and one from the JBV, who had worked with safety related matters in the orga-
nizations for a very long time, and who knew the intra-organizational narratives from both accidents. They recognized our
stories and ﬁndings. Therefore we claim that the material brought forward through this study may be regarded as a valid
picture of the reception history of these two accidents.5. Results
Before we present our data we brieﬂy return to our initial challenge: do accident investigations imply learning? Major rail
accidents still tend to occur in Europe as a reminder upon the difﬁculties of revealing and managing major risks. Norway is
no exception and represent an average of the European countries (Evans, 2011), but the data material is very limited. After
World War II major derailing and head on collisions have occurred approximately every ten years in Norway. The last major
accident occurred in 2010. The Accident Investigation Board Norway started to investigate rail accidents and incidents in
2002. They do however not seem to have an acknowledged framework for how learning should be approached. Obviously
there is a need for further analysis of learning processes following accidents in general and railway accidents in particular.5.1. The contexts of the studied accidents – A brief description of the Norwegian railway system
Traditionally the Norwegian railway system has been under strict political control, through the organization Norwegian
State Railway (Norges Statsbaner, NSB) as a governmental unit placed directly under the Ministry of Transport and Commu-
nications (MoC). The ﬁnancial basis and budget frames were decided by the Storting on an annual basis. Until 1996 NSB was
responsible for the infrastructure as well as passenger and cargo operations on the rail network. We also claim that NSB was
the regulatory body as by a parliamentary decision in 1939 NSB was given the power to govern all safety aspects related to
rail operations (Johannesen, 2007). NSB organized its own accident investigation board. This was the situation in 1975 when
the Tretten accident occurred.
As a consequence of the changes in the European regulatory framework for railways, the structure of the railway admin-
istration in Norway was gradually altered from 1996 and onwards. A new governmental body (Jernbaneverket, Norwegian
National Rail Administration, JBV) was established under the MoC, with responsibility for the infrastructure. NSB continued
as a government-owned transport company, supposed to compete on equal conditions with private transport companies.
The Norwegian Railway Authority (Statens jernbanetilsyn, SJT) was established as a separate regulatory and supervisory
organization. This new organization of the Norwegian railway sector was only partly active in 2000 when the Åsta accident
occurred. SJT had been a separate organization all since 1996, but even though JBV and NSB had been described as separate
organizations since then, they had been headed by the same Director General till June 1999 and they had close co-operation
related to several railway related functions.
Table 1 shows the development in transported passengers and goods since 1960. Compared to other transport modes,
railway transport had a decrease in market shares, at the time of both the Tretten and the Åsta accidents.
Since 1920 there have been eight major accidents, with 5 or more fatalities, on the Norwegian railways. Since the early
1970s the death ﬁgures on Norwegian railways have shown a decreasing trend. Most fatal accidents have been due to people
being run down on the track, collisions at level crossings and situations where people have tried to enter or disembark from a
moving train.
In 1995 and 1996 the casualty numbers were at a historic low, with only two people killed each year, while in 1992 and
1993 the fatality frequency was respectively 12 and 11. The late 1990s were characterized by a relaxed attitude in the rail-
way sector towards safety and a strong belief that safety was under control (Skovdahl, 2001). The Åsta accident turned this
impression upside down.Table 1
Domestic transport work on railwaysa 1960–2009 Vågane and Rideng (2010).
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
Passenger-kilometre (mill) 1755 1502 2250 2011 2857 3012
% of total 15.1 5.8 5.5 3.7 4.4 4.1
Tonne-kilometre (mill) 1056 1448 1657 1632 1775 2804
% of total 12.1 9.7 9.9 8.6 6.3 8.1
a Trams and suburban railways are not included as railway transport.
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Below we present the rail accidents, the narratives, the causal explanations and controversies revealed through the
documentation.
5.2.1. The Tretten accident (1975)
On 22 February the express passenger train from Trondheim (train 404) heading south towards Oslo was on schedule.
Train 404 consisted of locomotive, baggage car, baggage/conductor car, restaurant car and ten passenger coaches. The north-
bound scheduled passenger train from Oslo (train 351) was headed north to Åndalsnes on the same single-track line as train
404. Train 351 consisted of locomotive, goods wagon, baggage/conductor car, cafeteria car and ten passenger coaches, and
was 35 min late. Rail trafﬁc control had therefore relocated the crossing point of the two trains from Fåvang station to Tret-
ten station, south of Fåvang, approximately 30 km north of Lillehammer. The section from Oslo to Trondheim (552 km) was
equipped with remote control (CTC). CTC means that signals, points etc are controlled from remote signaling centers, in this
case the rail trafﬁc control center at Hamar. The northbound train departed Tretten without the crossing having taken place
and the head-on collision occurred approximately 850 m from the station. It was the winter holiday week in Norway and the
estimated number of people on board the two trains was 800. The estimated speeds of the trains were 60 km/h (404) and
50 km/h (351) respectively. The collision forces were therefore enormous and the goods wagon behind the engine car of
the southbound train was propelled over the roof of train 351 to a passenger carriage further behind in which most of
the deceased were located. Twenty-seven passengers were killed and twenty-one passengers and four NSB staff were seri-
ously injured. Both locomotives were severely damaged. Three passenger coaches and a goods wagon had to be scrapped and
a number of other passenger coaches sustained major or minor damage. The estimated material loss was put at NOK 15 mil-
lion (1975), which at that time was equal to the cost of approximately 50 Norwegian average villas in populated areas.
5.2.2. The Åsta accident (2000)
On January 4 a southbound diesel-powered passenger train, No. 2302 from Trondheim headed to Hamar on the Røros line,
departed Rena station at 13:07. A northbound diesel-powered passenger train, No. 2369 (engine car and steering car) from
Hamar to Rena departed Rudstad station at the same time, and was then on a collision course with the southbound train on
the single track line. The collision occurred at Åsta at 13:12. The engine car of the northbound train was completely wrecked,
while the following (steering) car sustained minor damage and remained upright on the rails. The locomotive of the south-
bound train was severely damaged and tilted. The front carriage buckled and derailed. The next carriage also derailed, but
remained upright. The rear carriage remained on the rails. A major ﬁre immediately broke out in the forward area of both
trains, and a few minutes later ﬁre broke out in the ﬁrst carriage of the southbound train. The ﬁre eventually spread to the
remaining two carriages. 19 people were killed, and 67 persons survived. Several passengers were trapped and killed in the
subsequent ﬁre. None of the survivors were seriously injured. The magnitude of loss of assets has never been analyzed.
5.3. Investigation issues and controversies
5.3.1. The Tretten accident
The Tretten-accident was investigated by an in-house investigation committee consisting of nominated members repre-
senting the different sections of NSB. These members came together a few hours after the collision and started their work in
the Hamar rail trafﬁc control center. They arrived at Tretten station 5 h after the accident. Following the accident investiga-
tion report (Kristensen et al., 1975) a number of other reports were written (Holen and Silkoset, 1976; NSB, 1976; Seim and
Holtsmark, 1976). The purpose of these reports was twofold. Firstly, the hypotheses that the remote centralized trafﬁc con-
trol (CTC) system was malfunctioning or that signals had been misunderstood due to environmental factors were investi-
gated. Secondly, suggestions for safety improvements and related costs were outlined.
The investigation committee delivered its report on 17 March, only 1.5 months after the accident. Their conclusion was
clear: ‘‘The accident investigation committee therefore concludes that there have been no failures or malfunctions of the CTC
system and safety equipment and thus there can be no explanation for the accident other than that train 351 departed Tret-
ten station against a stop signal’’. There were no critical reﬂections on the consequence scenario in the investigation report.
For example the coach that most of the deceased were sitting was totally wrecked by the coach in front of it. This coach was
thrown up in the collision, tearing off the roof of the passenger coach and ending up on top of it. There was no discussion of
the structural barriers that could have prevented the devastating outcomes. The report concentrated mainly on the issue,
‘‘why did the accident happen?’’ All the resources were therefore devoted to clariﬁcation of the reliability of the remote con-
trol system or whether it was the operators (conductor and/or train driver) who misinterpreted the signals.
NSB and the Police agreed on their ﬁndings, and both the train driver and the conductor of the northbound train were
prosecuted. The conductor, who was eventually put on trial, was found not guilty, but since it was an appeal court decision1
the grounds for the decision were not open for insight. The decision was made by a jury that only answers yes or no to the ques-
tion of criminal liability.1 Eidsivating Appeal Court 24 June, 1976.
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decision, which he believed was erroneous and that both the Police and NSB had made their cases in an objective and accu-
rate way. NSB maintained its standpoint that the only feasible measure was the implementation of ATS, which it maintained
had already been decided upon before the accident.
5.3.2. The Åsta accident
The Norwegian National Railway Administration (JBV) was designated as the scapegoat, apparently with good reason
judging by JBV’s own comments on the public report (NOU 2000). Why was JBV blamed? JBV had not absorbed ‘‘modern
safety management’’, and according to the commission JBV was more or less resistant to the concept. Modern safety man-
agement was deﬁned as risk based, which the commission interpreted as meaning that risk analyzes should govern all
phases and areas of railway activities. NSB, the train transport operator, was spared criticism because it had carried out some
risk analyzes.
The Groth commission (NOU 2000) analyzed the accident exclusively from a contemporary perspective. Its ﬁndings were
related to what should be expected from a high reliability organization building its activities on updated knowledge from
safety science and heavily inﬂuenced by the approach taken by the Norwegian petroleum industry. In the aftermath a num-
ber of dominant weaknesses were identiﬁed: distribution of responsibility was not clear; recommended safety measures had
not been followed up; there was no risk picture of railway activity; and risk-reducing measures were not systematically
identiﬁed. The commission concludes: ‘‘. . . the direct cause of the accident must either be a malfunction of the signaling sys-
tem or human error.’’ They also emphasized that it was unlikely that a technical malfunction of the signaling system could
have happened. But they pointed out that if speciﬁc risk analyzes for the Røros line with its current safety system had been
undertaken, they probably would have shown that new procedures applied to the total railway grid in Norway was not suf-
ﬁcient for this line. The Røros line was lacking ATC. The presence of ATC was a prerequisite for removing the visual control of
signals by two persons when leaving a station and possibly also for removing information in the time table available to the
driver on where crossings where scheduled. The commission concluded that thus there were no barriers compensating the
lack of ATC. Establishment of ATC was planned, but postponed without performing any further risk analyzes.
In the documentation studied we have found no risk analyzes or other documentation that could establish a speciﬁc risk
picture for the Røros line at the relevant point of time.
The Groth commission did not attempt to analyze the situation as it appeared in 2000 from a temporal perspective. Thus
the changes in the Norwegian railway sector the last ten years before the accident occurred were only partly described.
JBV’s own investigation (JBV, 2001) found no other direct cause than the fact that the train had passed the exit signal
unauthorized. The investigation also raised criticism of JBV’s safety management system that allowed only one barrier,
namely the train driver, between train in safe condition and train in head-on situations. JBV chose to publish its ﬁnal report
in June 2001, after the publicly appointed commission’s report and the subsequent prosecution.
The Police were more critical of the narrative placing the blame on the train driver misinterpreting the red signal. With
help from the University of Oslo the Police concluded that: ‘‘From a holistic assessment of the evidence, it is possible that the
northbound train did in fact exit Rudstad station upon a signal that was correct in relation to normal exit’’.
NSB concluded that the most probable scenario was that the train driver of the northbound train was convinced that the
crossing was to happen at Rena station. They also claimed that this must have been discussed with the conductor since he
gave a signal for normal exit time. Furthermore, NSB claimed that the signals at Rudstad station were clearly visible to the
driver, the driver was very experienced, and the driver could scarcely have failed to see the red light during the 45 s it took to
pass the exit signal.
5.4. Written stories – Accommodating learning
5.4.1. The Tretten accident
Apart from the material from the National Archives of Norway, our most prominent ﬁnding from studying the written
sources from the period around the accident is the dearth of any relevant written information. The accident was thoroughly
dealt with by the mass media in the days just after it happened, but later there seems to be a general lack of public interest
around the accident and its causes.
At that time, NSB used to issue an annual publication on railway accidents. This concentrated mostly upon ﬁgures and
quantitative facts, and never presented any qualitative analyzes or deeper interpretations of the ﬁgures presented. This
was true of the publication for year 1975. The Tretten accident is presented in the ﬁgures for 1975 and given a mere mention
in a paragraph: ‘‘The Tretten accident on 22 February 1975 was the biggest accident of NSB’s operational life, with 27 fatal-
ities’’. Nothing more was discussed. In the same publication the safety measures were presented, consisting of an increase in
sections with remote control, new signaling and warning systems and secured level crossings. We accessed the material
from 1973 to 1977 and these measures were typical for the period. The accident did not inﬂuence the level of investment
in safety systems.
In the national professional journals there were similarly no deeper analyzes or reﬂections on the causes of the accident.
The accident was however used more rhetorically as an argument for speeding up the ongoing implementation of an auto-
matic train stop-system (ATS). This technologymade it impossible for the train driver to continue driving after passing a light
signal showing red (‘‘stop’’). The decision was formally made in 1976 by the NSB board, which emphasized that this decision
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1966 and a development project awarded to Sintef in Trondheim, but in 1973 the Norwegian government turned Sintef’s solu-
tion down because it was too expensive to implement (20 MNOK) (see Draft Resolution no. 1 1968-69 to Draft Resolution no. 1
1973-74).
At this point it is worth noting that this accident occurred in an organization that since around 1960 had been in the pro-
cess of implementing centralized train control (CTC). CTC involves centralized control of light signals instead of local control
of the signals at every station with manual exchange of control orders by telegraph and telephone between the stations and
between a regional central and the stations. Under the local system, deviations from the published timetable for any train
were announced by a written order from the duty ofﬁcer at the station to the train personnel. This written procedure was
abandoned when CTC was implemented. Obviously this barrier was regarded as abundant under the new technology. When
reading the material related to the Tretten accident, we found no material documenting a possible need for re-establishing
such a barrier after this accident. NSB was focusing on the upcoming new technology ATS/ATC.
The Director General and the NSB board did not reﬂect on the accident other than describing it in the annual report of
1975. Safety was not regarded as a speciﬁc issue, neither were any concrete safety measures discussed. There was no attempt
to describe or measure safety levels. The historical fatalities were classiﬁed as travelers, employees and ‘‘others’’. The ‘‘oth-
ers’’ class also included high death tolls, but these were related to accidents at level crossings, people walking on the line etc.,
and not given much attention. The Tretten accident was soon just another accident integrated in the statistics with no special
impact whatsoever.
We have not been able to ﬁnd any regular risk analyzes performed or even mentioned preceding the CTC process, but it
seems clear that the reasoning behind the centralization of train control was to keep safety at least at the same high level as
with local, manual control, and at the same time to save on manpower and probably increase regularity. It is possible that the
removal of a manual barrier was not regarded as removal of a safety barrier.
In the trial process after the Tretten accident involving the conductor, an expert was called in for the defense. He made a
general fault tree model (selected from a foreign accident) of the causes of a head-on collision. The response from NSB was
that this kind of analysis was not relevant at all, and especially not since NSB had already clariﬁed the causes of the accident.
Analyzing risk was not regarded as in any way beneﬁcial for managing safety, according to NSB.
In the aftermath of the investigation committee’s report, the general assumption was that the northbound train had
crossed the exit signal unauthorized. Parallel stories were presented, but none of them were given weight. For example
the role of the remote train management system was never questioned. However, the NSB board focused its attention on
what changes could counter the problem of negligent train crews. They scrutinized three alternatives: (1) improve situation
awareness for the train crew (visibility, information, radio communication), (2) change procedures for conductor and train
drivers, and (3) implement technical solutions to avoid head-on collisions.
None of the alternatives was immediately implemented. NSB cooperated with Swedish Railways in its planning of auto-
matic train stop/automatic train control (ATS/ATC). The idea was that Norway could purchase the same system as Sweden.
The planning phase lasted for many years and it was an interesting observation that the system had still not been imple-
mented on the Røros line in year 2000. Change in procedures was superﬁcially analyzed, with the conclusion that no changes
were needed in the safety regulations (code 401-405). Investing in radio communication systems was seriously assessed, but
rejected because of high costs. In general, economic considerations seem to have been a major obstacle to improving safety
in NSB, and the organization had no tools for assessment of safety levels apart from reactive experience-based management.
In a way we could say that NSB both conﬁrmed and understood its systems by conducting both the investigation and the
assessment. In their view, safety would be improved as soon as the ATC/ATS was implemented. NSB’s sole reliance on this
fact as the only solution could be regarded as hampering learning. There was a total lack of any reﬂection on possible weak-
nesses within the organization, its systems and practices. This could of course be related to the strong position held by the
monopolist NSB, or to the incremental approach to safety throughout Norway’s rail history. What the literature seems to
suggest about NSB’s attitude towards the accident is that the organization wanted to clean up the track and make the acci-
dent history as soon as possible. We have not been able to ﬁnd any indication of strong political interest in this accident.
5.4.2. The Åsta accident
5.4.2.1. Findings in NSB. It was important for us to clarify how safety issues had been dealt with by the board of NSB in the
period around this accident. For the years immediately before the accident (1998 and 1999) we were able to identify 219
cases handled by the board, of which only one was clearly related to safety (case 68/98 in the plan for emergency prepared-
ness). In addition, 20 cases had more indirect references to safety issues (for example one case on maintenance of new
express train sets).
For the years 2000–2002, following the accident, we identiﬁed 362 cases handled by the board, of which 35 were clearly
related to safety including governance of risk. Among issues covered in this period were routines for reporting on safety
issues to the board (case 44/00), safety indicators (case 04/01), analysis of root causes of incidents (case 65/01) and cases
on experience from external and internal investigation of incidents (e.g. cases 89/01, 54/02 and 119/02). No similar cases
were found for the two years studied before this accident.2 Both conductor and train driver were initially prosecuted for the errors leading to the accident, but only the conductor was put on trial in court, and found
not guilty.
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the accident. At a board meeting on 6 January it was decided that: ‘‘NSB would like the investigation process to be completed
as soon as possible so that any relevant measures can be taken to further increase the level of safety’’ (our translation, case
02/00).5.4.2.2. Findings in JBV. By the end of 1999 JBV was in the process of developing its role as infrastructure owner, becoming
independent from NSB. The tendency seen in 1999 from the management minutes of meeting was that JBV was assessing
how it could become more effective in its working processes (e.g. the strategy document from June 1999 did not mention
safety concerns at all). Competition from the other transport sectors was seen as the major problem by JBV, to be met
through cost effectiveness. The context was one in which JBV was struggling to ﬁnd its place in railway transport after having
lost signiﬁcant parts of the system which it had previously controlled. It had little experience of being supervised by an
external enterprise and their respective roles were not yet clariﬁed.
Furthermore, the past (traditional incident-based) safety management regime was under challenge and changes from the
early 1990s onwards (Blakstad et al., 2010). This occurred in a decade in which New Public Management (NPM) principles
were gaining a foothold. The splitting up of NSB was also a result of NPM. One topic of discussion in the management meet-
ing was how JBV was to control its trafﬁc enterprises using the NSB infrastructure, rather than how they themselves man-
aged trafﬁc safety. We have found no documents discussing the prioritisation between safety and efﬁciency related to the
railway sector in this period. In some documents it is merely stated that safety shall be maintained, but mostly the safety
issue seems to be a tacit, non-explicit issue when discussing organizational and operational changes.
It is noteworthy to mention that the supervisory organization (SJT) was concerned about the use of the new procedures
related to leaving a station on the Røros-line. SJT problematized it for the Ministry, and the Ministry acknowledged the chal-
lenge, but neither the Ministry, nor JBV or NSB really followed up with further analyzes or changes in the operational
procedures.
Recorded accidents at the time of the millennium were also at a historic low. However, on 30 November the JBV manage-
ment meeting discussed implementation of a risk-based safety regime. This was partly related to the multimodal planning
initiative, the National Transport Plan, in which JBV represented the railway sector. This plan introduced the Zero Vision phi-
losophy, created to introduce safety and risk assessment as proactive tools for safety management.
The Åsta accident happened on 4 January, and the JBV management did not hold its meeting until 26 January, in sharp
contrast to NSB. Of concern was the new safety management regulations that came into force on 1 January, in particular
the sections describing ‘‘responsibilities and safety organization’’, and what this meant. Even at this juncture the accident
was discussed in terms of improvement measures, such as ATC and radio communications. Their understanding of the acci-
dent was that it was the result of human error.
When the Åsta commission presented its investigation results and consultative comments had been noted, JBV system-
atized and distributed the information/recommendations to the relevant sections working with the projects (topics) of con-
cern. Their major aim was to develop an action plan. These activities started in November 2000 and most of them ﬁnished
before summer 2001. The accident led to 99 different projects in JBV. These included 16 activities related to safety culture
and competence, 51 activities related to structure, organization and management systems, and 32 activities related to plans,
documentation and technology. JBV was very loyal to the investigation commission and was fully open to implementing its
recommendations, at least as presented in the documentation from management. The authorities, MoC and SJT, were in gen-
eral concerned with technological solutions in addition to the departure procedure. Organizational measures, cultural
approaches, competence activities or response to passengers’ needs are scarcely mentioned in the written documentation
on which our ﬁndings are based.
Even though there were different narratives about why the northbound train had passed the signal and switch at Rudstad
station, the texts from 2001 to 2002 indicate that the human barriers were not to be relied upon, with the result that imple-
mentation of ATC/ATS became the major concern for the JBV and SJT follow-up programme. Throughout 2000 the implemen-
tation of ‘‘modern safety management principles’’ was recurrently discussed at JBV management meetings.Table 2
Speciﬁc change measures.
Measure Started Completed (observed or planned)
Automatic trafﬁc control (ATC) Jan 2000 SJT approvala
Safety management system 1990s End of 2001
GSM-R (train radio communication) Started 2005
NSB 87 (PLS-CTC-system) Jan 2001 SJT approvala
NSI 63 (relay-CTC-system) SJT review
Audiovisual (acoustic) alarm in trafﬁc control centre Feb 2000 22.12.2000
Safety regulations 1999 2003
Revise departure procedure Summer 2000 1.1.2002
a The Norwegian Railway Authority had required full re-engineering of the signaling system and therefore replaced the central trafﬁc control system with
manual trafﬁc management. JBV had planned to ﬁnish its work before summer 2001.
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the investigation commission and how the organization was working to implement measures. Table 2 depicts the change
measures as described in a note from JBV to MoC dated 9 February 2001.
JBV was under pressure from both its owner (MoC) and SJT, and its response to the ‘‘letter of award’’ was that it would
prioritize ‘‘measures recommended by the Åsta commission and demands or expected demands from the Norwegian Rail
Authorities, .. ’’. SJT was very concerned about how JBV would meet the principle of ‘‘single error’’, which says that no single
failure shall imply risk of serious accident (e.g. two opposing trains on the same section). On the other hand a vast number of
safety projects related to other lines had been identiﬁed (tunnel safety, level crossings, securing the line against avalanches
etc), which personnel in JBV thought would be more effective than upgrading the Røros line.
All government institutions and other bodies consulted were in favour of risk-based regulation and management of the
rail transport sector. This paradigm was so fully accepted as the ideal principle that no one questioned its fundamentals. This
is quite interesting since employees in JBV knew all about the hazards but the hazards were neglected. Would a new safety
regime resolve this situation?
Departure procedures became an important issue in the understanding of the Åsta accident. The work consisted of safety
assessments, based on how changes affected risks (qualitative statements). SJT assessed the work against the single error
principle, while NSB requested technical solutions wherever possible. The result was that the departure procedure for sec-
tions with no ATC was brought back to the old principles, in which train controller and train driver both must conﬁrm rec-
ognized signals or must communicate with the station master (railway clerk – train dispatcher).
5.4.2.3. Findings in documentation on superior level. As the Storting has traditionally had a strong interest in governing the
Norwegian railway system, it is of interest to analyze documents presented from the government (Ministry of Transport
and Communications, MoC) as a basis for the parliamentary decisions. The situation on Norwegian railways was debated
several times during the 1990s. Every year there was a description of the situation following the state budget proposal. In
addition several ‘‘white papers’’ and draft resolutions were presented. Many of these documents demonstrate the politicians’
extreme focus on detail. For example Draft Resolution no. 15 (1997-98) MoC described in detail problems with fractures in
railway sleepers on a local section of the national rail network. But in no documents is the Storting presented with an overall
analysis of the safety situation. No safety analyzes are presented either when the Storting debated the budget, but there is a
great deal of data on punctuality and capacity.
It is unclear to us to what extent JBV was invited to take direct part in the formulation of the texts presented to the Stort-
ing, but we have found several examples of communication from JBV to MoC presenting JBV’s (and previously NSB’s) views
on e.g. the maintenance status of the infrastructure.6. Discussion
The contexts in which each of the accidents took place must be considered if we are to understand the contrasts between
the accident explanations and related recommendations. The method of close reading of texts from the two quite similar
accidents that occurred during different epochs of safety management in the Norwegian railway system makes it possible
to study learning in a meta perspective. By applying the concepts presented by Charon (2006): frame, form, time, plot
and desire, when reading the texts we used a standardized method to identify and distinguish different aspects related to
how safety management and accident causes were narrated and interpreted.
The Åsta accident was explained from a system perspective in which the lack of modern risk-based management in the
railway system was seen as a major weakness. On the other hand an attempt to explain variations, e.g. in a system’s perspec-
tive, in the cause analysis of the Tretten accident was promptly dismissed by NSB as meaningless as the accident was per-
ceived as having human error as its clear direct cause.
Learning from these accidents was never highlighted as a speciﬁc goal of the external investigations and internal pro-
cesses in NSB and JBV. However, all relevant actors launched internal projects and change processes immediately after
the Åsta accident, independent of the report from the commission appointed by the government. To a large extent learning
was related to change initiatives, such as technical, operational and organizational measures, whereas conﬁrmation and
comprehension processes were not so evident. The extent to which the accidents resulted in a rush to implement costly tech-
nical measures (ATC/ATS, radio-communication and improved signaling systems) is unclear. The Tretten case showed a more
stable organization with little open controversy about the accident. Lessons learnt were assumed to be that human errors
needed to be met with technological barriers, while other possible measures were neglected.
In both cases learning seems to be framed within the prevailing understandings of safety management and accident
causes. Learning as a phenomenon that could challenge the contemporary, time-speciﬁc pre-understandings of what consti-
tutes good safety management never was proﬁled, from outside or inside the affected organizations.
6.1. Opposing safety paradigms – A contribution to accident occurrence?
The two accidents and the related learning yield two very different approaches to safety. The Tretten accident reﬂects an
almost purely instrumental approach where everything is about the robustness of the socio-technical system. The logic is
364 G.S. Braut et al. / Transportation Research Part A 69 (2014) 354–366that technical barriers must be in place to protect the system from fallible humans. This focus seems to be a hindrance for
further learning. Throughout industry in general, and perhaps transport in particular, unlike today safety was not a central
issue in 1975. For example in the mid-seventies aviation passenger death rates were as high as they have ever been. Atten-
tion to safety concentrated on system and design and building robustness into the aircraft itself. This focus was a result of
many large accidents in that period. Eventually the human factor assumed greater importance in accident explanations. The
development of organizational and procedural safety systems and design through safety management systems and the use of
risk assessments were also important developments. The aviation sector increasingly focused on incremental improvements
in technology and procedures. In contrast to this, the Norwegian rail transport sector was inﬂuenced by the internal control
regime from the early 1990s. At that time the internal control regime and the structured procedure-oriented regime were in
conﬂict, which created a vacuum in the ongoing change process. Very few concerns were therefore raised about the dimin-
ished safety on remote sections of the Norwegian rail system such as the Røros line.
At the time of the Åsta accident knowledge from previous accidents were present but not actively used. For example a
consulting company carried out an accident investigation of an accident at a station in Oslo between a local passenger train
and a shunting locomotive. The same consultancy recommended further collaboration that would allow the consultancy to
teach NSB risk-based safety management (Sten and Øien, 1994). Responsibility for safety in NSB seems to have become frag-
mentized and attitudes relaxed in the face of the decreasing incident data seen towards the end of the 1990s.
In 2000 risk was already a buzz-word and safety was a central issue with actors in the transport sector. Risk had become
the interest the scientiﬁc community and the risk assessments were a widespread tool in many industries. However, the
implementation of risk informed safety management was by no means completed in Norway or elsewhere (Elms, 2001),
but was in a transition process at the JBV when the Åsta accident occurred. The introduction of modern safety management
principles thereby became unavoidable after the Åsta accident. JBV was vulnerable because the organization was used as a
scapegoat, and the new safety regime was implemented without critical reﬂection. Changes were requested. Neither the
management of the JBV nor the employees had taken on board the full implications of adopting a safety management sys-
tem. It could be questioned whether the introduction of a new regime was positive for the Norwegian railway system, or if it
contributed to the production of the Åsta accident.
The shift in the safety management approach in the railway sector following the Åsta accident ensured strict attention to
risk-based safety and a common goal of implementing risk-based safety management by all parties. We studied the risk ana-
lyzes, the sectionanalyzes, for 2003/2004 (NjåandNøkland, 2005). Thesewere carriedoutbyexternal consultants, andonly to a
limited extent involved participation by in-house personnel. Analyzes were therefore not rooted in the organizations them-
selves, and conﬁdence in the analysis process varied. In house personnel who worked on safety lacked conﬁdence in the ﬁnd-
ings from external consultants. The JBV personnel believed that the risk analysts/’’experts’’ were erroneous in their risk
estimates. The general perception among safety experts at JBV was that the experts had failed to identify the ‘‘true’’ risk. The
safetyplan (SOP)wasopposedand thereforedidnotbecomean importantpart of thepractical safetymanagement in the ‘‘value
chain’’ at JBV. Our data showed that the risk analyzeswere rarely discussedwithin the organization as arguments for particular
actions to ensure safety. The risk analyses were merely statements. Another factor that made use of risk assessments difﬁcult
was a poor understanding of probability theory and therefore the probabilistic calculations that formed the foundation for rec-
ommendations in the reports. Based on our analysis of the board protocols fromNSB for the period 1998–2002 it is possible to
claim that itwas the Åsta accident itself that triggered themost important processes in the development of a safety governance
and riskmanagement system inNSB.When the report from the investigation boardwas released in the beginning of November
2000, all important processes were initiated in the NSB organization. Somewere even begun in the days immediately after the
accident and were further developed during the spring of 2000. There is however no doubt that this accident moved safety
issues from the operational and managerial level and into the NSB board’s strategic considerations. The wide discrepancy in
the proportion of cases for the board on safety matters before (<<1%) and after (10%) the accident supports this view.
In the Norwegian railway system there have been some further serious accidents after 2000 that indicate that safety man-
agement may not have been successfully implemented everywhere in the system. For example the Sjursøya accident in 2010
killed three persons and injured four persons. The investigation clearly demonstrated that risk-informed management had
not been internalized in the main terminal organization (Njå and Braut, 2011).
The introduction of safety management principles in the Norwegian railway system can also be viewed from a political
angle in the sense that accidents can be seen as a collective failure of a safety system. Thus, when restructuring an industry
such as rail transport it becomes important to create clear responsibilities and roles. The time span from 1996 when it was
decided to separate the trafﬁc operator from the infrastructure owner till 1999 when the separation was completed, consti-
tuted a period where the interactive cooperation was unclear. This may explain why JBV did not fulﬁll their obligations to
carry out risk analyses.
Regardless of the use of safety management principles, safety is a generic concept that for a large part is deﬁned by who-
ever is using the term. Safety thereby becomes a political tool that can be used to argue for particular agendas, especially in
times with increased media focus on speciﬁc issues, such as immediately after accidents or the release of accident reports.
6.2. Investigations gave no new knowledge
The investigations following the two accidents did not present material that gave radically new knowledge to the affected
organizations about safety and accident prevention.
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seems to add another strong argument to the already-implemented decision to develop a comprehensive ATS/ATC system
in NSB. Thus no learning, in the sense of change, seems to have occurred. But it may be claimed that the possible learning
effect was conﬁrmation of existing knowledge.
In the aftermath of the Åsta accident several organizational and procedural changes were made, none of them were how-
ever built on new knowledge that was gained from the accident. The risk based approach which was under implementation
was not challenged, even though the Groth-commission e.g. questioned why the new procedures related to leaving the sta-
tions were applied on railway lines without modern safety technology.
Nevertheless, the Tretten accident gave a strong incentive to complete already-started work on implementing a new
safety system in the Norwegian railway sector. We ﬁnd that the Tretten accident contributed to learning because it con-
ﬁrmed the importance of the new approach. In addition it may also have led to better comprehension of the need for change
for those persons still in doubt about the new safety system. We argue, however, that the accident in itself was not the rea-
son why the changes were made, as the arguments behind the changes had already been presented in the late 1950s.
Learning from the Åsta accident seems to have been initiated by the accident itself, not by the subsequent investigation
process. In the very afternoon of the day of the accident, the board of NSB made a decision to strengthen its safety efforts on
the basis of the accident. It is interesting to note that responsible authorities (the Ministry and possibly also the Storting
through the annual budgets) were well aware of the infrastructural factors that were possible contributors to the causal
chain of the Åsta accident. Neither the investigation committee nor the media penetrated possible organizational causes
beyond the level of JBV.
7. Conclusion
Our empirical material, extracted from written documentation through close reading, leads us to conclude that neither of
the studied accidents presented any new or previously unknown causal mechanisms. No unforeseeable stories that could
principally change the way of thinking about safety and accident prevention in the affected organizations emerged. The
experiences gained were interpreted inside the prevailing perceptions of railway safety systems, both after the accidents
in 1975 and in 2000. The needs or possible advantages of differentiating safety procedures between railway systems with
different types of technologies were not really challenged.
The stories about the Tretten accident seem to have been rapidly assimilated in the organization, merely enhancing the
then common way of thinking about railway safety and conﬁrming existing views on the importance of establishing ATS/
ATC.
The stories about the Åsta accident seem to have galvanized existing efforts to implement the new safety management
system in the Norwegian railways. It may also have convinced those who doubted the necessity of the new system of the
need for change. It is also interesting to note that it seems to be the accident in itself, not the subsequent investigation that
triggered this enhanced safety work.
In order to generalize our ﬁndings we claim that:
 The Åsta incident in itself triggered activity in the affected organizations.
 The involved parties did not wait for outside investigators to determine responsibility or reveal hidden causes.
 The causes of the incidents are immediately understood by relevant professionals without deeper analysis from investi-
gation boards.
Based upon these ﬁndings we ﬁnd that it is important to establish relevant narratives about the incidents so that involved
professionals can intuitively understand the chain of causes and implement relevant countermeasures. Immediate activities
related to storytelling and reﬂection in the affected organizations should be encouraged if the aim is learning.
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